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Over the two past decades markets have come to play an increasingly central role in the governance of the 
use of force. Security forces (internal and external) across the world have strived to become more efficient. 
In the process they have both outsourced an increasing number of functions ranging from logistics functions 
to security/guarding functions and encouraged markets to take over growing parts of security provision. The 
result is the development of a global market for force. Incidences such as that in which Ex. Blackwater now 
Xe contractors shot 17 civilians in Nisour Square Baghdad (16 September 2007) has granted the market 
considerable media attention and placed it at the heart of political debates. The market and its development 
have been extensively analyzed and discussed. However, when it comes to problematizing the political 
implications of market there is still much work to be done (for an overview of the literature see Leander, 
2009b, , 2009a). While the implications of market logics for the state and particularly for the state monopoly 
on the legitimate use of force has attracted some attention, far less attention has been paid to how the market 
changes substantive politics and political practices (with or without altering the formal role of states). It is to 
this kind of thinking this paper wants to contribute. More specifically, it is an attempt to think about the 
substantive politics of citizenship. 
Departing from an elaboration of the idea of a citizenship protection nexus (1), the argument 
developed below is that the introduction of a neo-liberal governance forms security is leading to far reaching 
(but largely unacknowledged). It is transforming the understanding of the rights to protection that come with 
citizenship, de facto transforming it from a general right tied to political citizenship to contracted right to be 
negotiated (2). At the same time, far from working to weakening the role of the state in security provision, 
the market is reinforcing it (3) and accentuating the military aspect of protection (4). The overall 
consequence is that the nexus tying citizenship to protection is increasingly shaped by the commercialized 
national and military concerns (promoted by public and private security professionals). As this paper 
concludes, attempts to frame and shape the citizenship-protection nexus in alternative ways—for example 
attempts to de-link citizenship from states and/or to de-militarize citizenship—are the main causalities of this 
re-ordering. 
1. The Citizenship-Protection Nexus 
Citizenship and protection are closely tied to each other in discursive practice. As this section underscores 
they are often made constitutive of each other; they are tied together in a close nexus. However, the 
discursive practices linking citizenship and protection can vary—and have varied—historically as well as 
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across space. The centrality of the nexus and the scope for variation makes the exact articulation of the 
citizenship protection nexus a highly political matter: how exactly the nexus is shaped and organized tells us 
what kinds of protection is provided to whom, how and what terms as well as what duty and role protection 
providers are granted in fashioning the broader understanding of what citizenship entails. 
Protection as a (or the) fundamental citizenship right 
In her work on totalitarianism, Hannah Arendt defined citizenship as “the right to have rights”. She 
suggested that when the totalitarian regimes denied categories of individuals their citizenship, they left  them 
with little but the abstract and intangible general, universal natural (today we would say human) rights of 
man but with nowhere to claim these rights. This effectively turned these individuals into the “scum of the 
earth” deprived of citizenship and hence of rights and a place to turn to claim rights. They could 
consequently be cleared away with impunity (Arendt, 1979/1951). Arendt’s is an unusually strong argument 
underscoring the close link between citizenship and the right to claim protection. Deprived of their 
citizenship, individuals had nowhere to turn to claim rights including the right to minimal physical protection 
which figures as an absolute fundamental part of rights. Although not necessarily framed in Arendtian terms, 
the right to have the right to be protected figures centrally in thinking about citizenship more broadly.  
Indeed, protection figures centrally in thinking about citizenship and membership in a community 
across a broad range of contexts (Skinner and Stråth, 2003, Tilly, 1996). The Hobbsean justification for the 
cruel and oppressive Leviathan is that his presence ends the war of all against all and installs order. 
Citizenship grants the right to claim this specific protection (Hobbes, 1651 (1985)). Similarly in 
sociologically inspired political theory, the role of the state in monopolizing the legitimate use of force of 
course figures centrally to a degree where in Weber’s work it is turned into the definition of statehood 
(Weber, 1978). But beyond Weber, the monopoly on the use of force plays a key role also in e.g. Elias’ 
grand history of the civilizing process where it explains how civilization could evolved as citizens, protected 
by states, could evolve new (more civilized) forms of habitus where primary drives including violence were 
internalized and hence removed from public life (Elias, 1996). In fact, the idea that citizenship ought to 
provide the right to be protected remains with us today. In the discussion surrounding failed states and 
humanitarian intervention it is the failure (whether due to incapacity or to evil intention) that is used to claim 
that these states are failed and that intervention is justified (e.g. Krasner, 2004).  
This classical work on the role of the state as the protector of its citizens has often down played—if 
not outright silenced—the extent to which the right to be protected granted in citizenship entails violence. 
Hobbes gives ample space to reflection on the violence, arbitrariness and cruelty of the order shaping 
Leviathan, but underlines the extent to which the alternative is worse. His account paradoxically ends up 
tracing the violent oscillations between revolt and restoration (Sofsky, 1996).Weber never discusses the 
implications of the violent implications of the modern state monopoly on the legitimate use of force which at 
the end rested on a nationalist understanding of belonging (Walker, 1993). Elias acknowledges the 
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devastating potential of bureaucratized protection rights but hesitates to draw the full consequence of his 
argument: that civilization might be inherently violent (Elias, 1982, Bauman, 1989). Finally, and similarly in 
the context of failed states the violence of state is seen as failure of specific states not a potentially something 
indicating that the very notion of states may lead to increasing and considerable degrees of violence 
(Ehrenreich Brooks, 2005, Duffield, 2007, Herbst and Mills, 2003). 
This testifies to the continued centrality of the right to be protected in thinking about citizenship but 
also the extent to which there is awareness about the degree to which these rights are contextual, often highly 
imperfect and tied to widespread violence. In that sense few political theorists—including of the most 
conventional statist stamp—would be likely subscribers to Waltz claim that “citizens of states need not 
defend themselves” (Waltz, 1979: 104). Rather, they would wish to move the discussion beyond the general 
idea that citizenship entails some right to be protected and wish more detailed thinking on a lower level of 
abstraction where it becomes possible to think about how these rights are articulated and hence to see 
whether or not (and in what conditions) citizens need to defend themselves. If they are of a more critical 
stamp they would certainly also want to problematize the extent to which states and citizenship grounded in 
states itself comes to undermine peoples’ rights to protection and possibilities to refashion their political 
belonging; that is to formulate non-state centric political citizenships (Hassner, 1998, Somers, 2008, 
Benhabib, 2004). Whether from a classical or critical perspective, in clear the variable and political nature of 
the link between citizenship and the right to claim protection is amply recognized but its centrality is rarely 
denied. The right to claim protection is a fundamental part of citizenship. 
Protectors shaping citizenship 
The other side of the citizenship-protection nexus is the link that runs from the protectors to the shaping of 
citizenship more broadly. The right to claim protection—and the politics surrounding that right—is 
embedded in a broader context of citizenship, delineating and shaping a far reaching range of other rights 
citizenship makes it possible to claim. It has become draw on T. H. Marshall’s idea that the kinds of rights 
involved citizenship have expanded historically both in the sense that a growing number of individuals can 
claim them and in the sense that the range of rights to be claimed have expanded from civil, to political and 
social rights (Marshall, 1950). As will be sketched out, there is a tradition for thinking about the provision of 
protection and the protectors themselves as having a pivotal role in shaping these Marshallian rights; that is 
the substantive rights linked to citizenship.  
At the very basic the organization of protection is often tied directly to the development of civic and 
political rights in their modern form. “If the sovereign state is inherently a polyarchic order, in which 
citizenship rights are the ‘price paid’ by the dominant class for the means of exercising its power, citizenship 
in turn implies acceptance of the obligations of military service [....] The nation-state and the mass army 




The organization of protection has been seen as closely tied to the development of social rights. In 
part this argument has been advanced by those who have thought of the armed forces as constructing national 
cohesion by integrating and educating the socially, economically and culturally disparate parts of states. As 
the Resident General in Morocco, Hubert Lyautey explained in words characteristic of his time (late 19th 
Century): “To tomorrows officers, you must say that if they have placed their ideals in a career of wars and 
adventures, it is not with us that they should pursue it: they will no longer find it there... Instead, give them 
the promising conception of the modern role of the officer who has become the educator of the entire nation” 
(quoted in Lecomte, 2001: 740). Conscription works as a “school of the nation” attempting (but often failing) 
to educate and integrate citizens across race, colour, gender and ethnicity in a fairly straightforward fashion 
(Krebs, 2004). More subtly, it has also been suggested to leave profound imprints on the how exactly 
different social citizenship rights are articulated and framed (Cowen, 2008). The idea that the armed forces 
continues to be present also at present in for example the debate about whether and how it is important that 
the armed forces reconfigure their recruitment to reflect and shape a “post-modern” political reality of 
multiple identities in their recruitment and organization(Moskos, 2000, Elshtain, 2000). 
 The organization of protection is also tied to the later expansion of citizenship rights to cover 
also political rights. Hence a comparative study on the role of conscription in Europe argues that “precisely 
because they were conscripted, citizens confidently insisted on certain rights from their states, rights that 
were more easily articulated and defended because of increased (state provided) education and growing self-
identification as members of a national community” (Mjøset and van Holde, 2002: 12). It is precisely this tit-
for-tat logic that leads to “the central paradox of European state formation”, whereby “the pursuit of war and 
military capacity [...] as a sort of by-product, led to a civilianisation of government and domestic politics” 
(Tilly, 1990: 206). Temptations to read this in simplistic linear, evolutionary and universal fashion should 
immediately be tempered by reference to the many authoritarian and military regimes that have had anything 
but an expansionary effect on citizenship rights (Huntington, 1957). The point here is simply to underline the 
extent to which the organization of protection led is conceived of as having played a pivotal role in giving 
birth and shape to political rights. 
 The accounts of the link between the organization of protection and citizenship rights could be 
expanded, made more subtle and complex. For the sake of the argument in this paper, the above is sufficient. 
The aim is simply to underscore the extent to which citizenship and protection are intrinsically linked in what 
is here called a nexus. The historical accounts (not to say histories) just referred to capture this link by 
underscoring the role of military organization in shaping the understanding of citizenship rights. The 
accounts—anchored in political theory—emphasising the right to claim rights, capture it by underscoring the 
centrality of the right to be protected for citizenship. Both types of account share an emphasis on the extent 
                                                     
1 The widely recognised waste of human lives tied to conscription and the related long history of desertions, mutinies, 
and testimonies from war periods make it amply clear that citizens have –often unwillingly–paid a high price for the 
development of citizen armies (Keegan, 1976, Paret, 1992). 
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to which the citizenship-protection nexus is subject to change with profoundly political implications. The rest 
of this paper explores how exactly the development of the market for force is reshaping the nexus both in 
terms of citizenship rights and in terms of how the organization of protection is tied to broader conceptions 
of citizenship. 
2. Contractualized Citizenship 
At the most immediate level the market for force might be seen as a variation on the theme of the more 
general trend towards what Somers terms “the contractualization of citizenship”, that is “an effort to 
reorganize the relationship between the state and the citizenry, from non-contractual rights and obligations to 
the principles and practices of quid pro quo market exchange” (Somers, 2008: 2). The very existence of the 
market both reflects and reinforces a logic whereby the right to claim protection is directly tied to the 
position of individuals and organizations in commercial relationships and their capacity to pay for the 
security services they contract rather than to their belonging to a political community. The consequence is a 
profound reshuffling of the politics in the citizenship-protection nexus. New market based hierarchies of 
rights are created and at the same time the politics of protection is increasingly negotiated in markets and 
based on market practices. 
Market Based Protection Hierarchies 
As underscored above the right to protection is often thought of as intrinsic to citizenship, part of the very 
foundations of what it means to be a citizen. The market for force has not altered this in formal terms. 
However, it has added yet another layer of ambiguity to the effective practice of this right. The market 
openly and explicitly creates a hierarchy among the citizens who can supplement or perhaps even replace the 
protection rights that the state is providing with the protection granted in markets. This is accentuated by the 
fact that many states have commercialized and contractualized their own provision of security. The 
consequence is that organizations and individuals that do not have the symbolic and/or economic means to 
engage in these contracts find their right to claim protection marginalized. 
 The market for force is a highly segmented and complex market. Firms specialize in providing 
certain kinds of services for specific ranges of clients. However, the point with the market is that clients 
should be able to find the kind of specialized protection they are interested in. The self description of CACI 
(the company that provided 50% of the interrogators in Abu Ghraib) is telling (and characteristic) in this 
regard. The welcome on the company’s home page reads: 
“We assist our government and commercial clients in developing integrated solutions that close gaps 
between security, intelligence and law enforcement to address complex threats to their security. 
CACI offers our clients a wide array of domain expertise through uniquely qualified special 
operations and intelligence professionals, industry leading experts who enable us to provide a wide 
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range of security and intelligence support services to contend with threats at home and abroad.” 
(http://www.caci.com/ ). 
A similar language is spoken by the following 
advertisements by Armorgroup and by Medical 
Support Solution. They both offer their services to an 
unspecified range of clients, underscoring their 
specialized knowledge relevant for clients working 
in environments plagued by insecurity as Armor 
group’s pictures show and Medical Support 
Solution’s explicit reference to “hazardous 
environments” confirm. These examples are but a 
small sample of the range (well beyond the 
conventional guard) of security services that can be 
bought by public and private clients alike on the market.  
The security services bought on a market differs from services provided by state agents in the sense 
that they can be tailored to suit specifically the needs of the client. The client can (at least in theory) be part 
of the contractual formulation of what the nature of the exact nature of the service provided should be and 
chose whom (which private company) they wish to contract 
this service from. The consequence is that security services 
provided by market actors tend to be driven by the defined in 
their contract. From the perspective of the client this means 
that (provided the contract is well formulated and followed) 
the service reflects the priorities of the client more directly 
and immediately than would an equivalent public security 
service. As a former Coalition Authority (in Iraq) advisor Ann 
Exline Starr reflects comparing her experience with 
contractors and soldiers; while soldiers provide protection 
they also have to worry about the logic of the overall mission 
which means that they often pay attention to and invest 
energy in leaving a positive impression.  Contractors by 
contrast told Starr that their mission was “to protect the 
principal at all costs. If that means pissing off the Iraqis, too bad” (quoted in Singer, 2007: 6).  
The market has in clear made a wide range of (at least potentially) effective and specialized security 
services available to citizens wishing to protect themselves by complementing the overall protection 
provided by states and/or by compensating for the absence or deficiencies of that protection. The services are 
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however and perhaps too obviously not available to everyone. Whether in the public or in the private sector 
the sine qua non for acquiring the security services provided in the rapidly expanding market for force is to 
have to capacity to engage the contract. At the most basic this implies having the financial resources 
necessary to pay for the service. But it also requires the “symbolic capital” (reputation, credibility, authority 
and understanding) that are necessary to engage in a contract with firms selling security services. One way 
companies often strive to protect their reputation is by refusing to work for clients that may for some reason 
appear “illegitimate”. The consequence is a strong element of inequality in the effective possibility to use to 
market as a basis for protection: while certain individuals and organizations—such as some journalists, 
NGO/aid workers, employees of international firms, diplomats, or heads of state—can buy services on the 
markets, others cannot. The possibility to claim the right to public protection is also highly unequally 
distributed. The difference the market makes in this respect is that it transforms this inequality into a 
principle: those better equipped to engage contracts deserve better protection than others. A right anchored in 
political membership is transformed into one based (at least partly) on contracts. 
The trend is accentuated by the extent to which contractual logics have been introduced also within 
state policies, including in the realm of the provision of protection. This is visible in many developing states 
where the individuals and organizations who can afford to are directly prompted to pay for their own 
protection, including by directly financing the public police and/or armed forces (for the cases of Nigeria, 
Sierra Leone and Kenya see Abrahamsen and Williams, 2006). However, in a more subtle format the same 
trend is palpable also in other states. Increasing the role of markets and public private partnerships has been 
official policy in most countries (Minow, 2003). The rationale has been to de-centralize and reduce red-tape; 
to responsibilize individuals and organizations for their own security provision; to empower them, allowing 
them to find the most effective solutions to their security problems. In the process the right to claim—not 
only protection in markets but also—public protection becomes contractualized hence accentuating the 
hierarchical consequences of market based protection. Decentralization effectively means that those who can 
afford to invest in their own protection and/or who are best at presenting themselves as worthy partners to 
the general contract for the distribution of public protection are likely to fare well where those who can do 
neither are unlikely to receive much attention. The contractualization of the right to be protected inherent in 
the market is in other words reinforced bolstered by the trend to contractualization also the right to claim 
state protection. By the same token the hierarchy of citizens’ right to claim protection is further accentuated.  
A stark confirmation of the reality of this contractualization also in the context of advanced states 
was provided by the “Katrina crisis” where some 1856 people died through dehydration, exposure, 
drowning, snakes or alligators mainly as a consequence of the failure of the state to provide them basic 
protection. The crisis effectively confirmed that “the government is no longer in the business of rewarding 
those who fail to take personal responsibility for their own well-being… [rather it aims to] forcefully 
“dissuade” people from seeking help from the state and the public sphere” (Somers, 2008: 93).  
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Market Negotiated Protection Rights 
The market has also further altered the citizenship-protection nexus by making markets increasingly central 
to the substantive interpretation of protection rights across a range of contexts. Although market actors 
would usually unanimously deny that they were engaged in the politics of defining protection rights—the 
companies (and their advocates) usually argue that they respond to demands—in their practice they 
constantly encroach on defining who is worthy of what kind of protection.  
 Somewhat paradoxically, considering the reluctance of companies working in the market for force to 
acknowledge any link to politics, many companies insist on the good they do in the world as they are 
protecting people. The two advertisements by Ex. Blackwater now Xe and EODT pictured here are revealing 
this regard. Ex. Blackwater now Xe insists in a 
moralizing tone characteristic of the company2
                                                     
2 Blackwater no longer exists. Its activities have been taken over by Xe and Eric Prince (its highly and controversial and 
visible) former president has resigned. 
 
that “those of us who enjoy freedom and 
democracy are now bound to help share it with 
the world”. EODT simply underlines its 
support for humanitarianism in a more discrete 
way, which is mirrored in the advertisements 
of many of the other larger firm. Beyond their 
differences in style these advertisements tell a 
similar story about the politics surrounding of 
protection: they both underline the significant 
role they (and by inference companies more 
generally) can play in providing protection for 
specific groups. They also both are very 
explicit about the fact that the protection they 
provide is good. EODT pictures an innocent 
child obviously worthy of protection. Ex. 
Blackwater now Xe promises progress and 
“hope to those who still live in desperate 
times”; it contrasts Rwanda, Somalia, the Congo etc. (writ in grey) with colorful pictures of a better world. 
The explicit message in both advertisements is in other words that the companies are (at least potentially) 
significant and that they protect those who deserve to be protected.  
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The de facto message the advertisements are sending is 
that protection rights may well be negotiated in markets between 
the companies and those willing and capable of paying for those 
rights to be protected. This logic which inspires much of the self-
promotion and advertising in the industry is well captured by the 
title of an article dealing with the potential role of private 
military companies in Africa: “write a check, end a war” 
(Brooks, 2000). The suggestion no doubt sounds attractive and 
practical to many. However, it is worth to pause for a minute and 
underscore the extent to which this kind of practical, market 
based solution implies a displacement of political process. Just as 
when protection rights are contractualized more generally, 
politically anchored understanding of who is (or is not) worthy 
of protection are replaced by understandings informed solely on 
their market position. But even more strongly the processes in 
which protection rights are defined may be taking place without 
any directly influence or voice of those concerned. “Those who 
live in desperate times” and need Blackwater’s “selfless 
commitment and compassion” to move towards a better world 
are unlikely to have any voice or any way of shaping the role the 
company will (or will not) have in ensuring their protection 
rights. It is far more probable that those who will matter will be governments, NGOs, companies, armed 
forces and international organizations to which they have no ties. This displacement of politics away from 
those directly concerned, into the hands of those who (possibly for very good reasons) aspire to assist them is 
most likely to provoke resentment. People usually want to be involved and allowed to define their own 
political agendas and problems. The practical difficulty of ensuring they can do this is arguably one of the 
most serious limits to global civil society generally (Chandhoke, 2003). It is bound to create resentment 
against the market and those negotiating basic citizenship rights at a distance, in markets, on behalf of others. 
The argument in this section has underscored that market for force tends to reshape the citizenship-
protection nexus profoundly. It tends to lead to a contractualization of protection right. This transforms the 
right to protection from a right anchored in membership in a political community to a right derived from 
market positions with the implications that it sharpens the hierarchy among citizens. More than this, it also 
tends to displace the negotiation about the substantive content of protection rights towards markets in which 
those wishing to claim the right may have a limited role. The consequence is a watering down of the 
relevance of the citizenship-protection nexus. Citizens may have no right to rights—in this case the right to 
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be protected—if they do not also have a market position. With the spread of contractual logics of citizenship 
the problem of the stateless is arguably no longer limited to the stateless but expanded to those who do not 
have a market position. The argument in this section has been that such a contractual logic is inherent in the 
market for force and reinforces it. It has not been to suggest that this is the only existing understanding of the 
citizenship-protection nexus. Rather, precisely because there are contending logics it is important to seriously 
consider the effects of expanding the role of markets. 
3. Nationalized Protectors 
If the market for force tends to loosen the links between states and the rights their citizen have to claim 
protection rights, it has not correspondingly weakened the ties between those providing the protection and 
the state. On the contrary, it has actually and somewhat paradoxically tended to bolster the centrality of 
nationality, national belonging and states in the world of the security professionals. So while the significance 
of political belonging and politics has come to be less important on the citizen side of the citizenship 
protection nexus, the state remains central and may even become even more so on the protection side. This is 
equally true on the contractor and soldiering side of the protection side of the citizenship protection nexus. 
Nationalizing Soldiers 
The most immediate consequence of the market for force for armed forces across is that it creates an 
alternative source of security services. The extent to which this is a competition to the armed forces is often 
emphasized. The market obviously undermines the position of public institutions as employers of security 
professionals. Not only US and UK professionals, but also Latin American, African, Asian and continental 
European security professionals are employed by the private sector. 3
The need and wish to recruit foreigners is not only (or even mainly) linked to the development of a 
market for force. Drain on competent staff is a minor issue when seen in the broader context of the needs 
 But more than this the market creates 
scope for questioning the exclusive competence of national institutions as security providers. These are real 
challenges to public armed forces that are often highlighted. However, the market is also a very real source 
of recruits for many armed forces. This causes challenges to the cohesion and culture of many armed forces. 
Emphasizing the conventional “national” nature of soldiering has been a key way in which armed forces 
have responded both to the challenge of integrating new recruits and to the competition they face from 
markets. The consequence is that markets have not produced a de-linking of public soldiers/security 
professionals from state institutions but rather tended to reinforce this link. 
                                                     
3 It is hard to put numbers on these trends. The GAO tried, but could not find the necessary figures to document the 
draining effect of markets on the US armed forces. This says something about the difficulties involved in this even for 
one of the armed forces about which most information is available (GAO, 2008). The UN Working Group on 
Mercenaries provides some indications of the extent to which security professionals from developing countries work in 
the global market. But again, the figures are very partial and usually refer only to cases which have entailed some kind 
of complication (e.g. UN, 2009) 
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created by international operations. The market has more of a facilitating role in the process: on a direct level 
it is a source of employees, but perhaps more importantly it normalizes the idea that foreigners (security 
professionals or not) can be recruited into national armed forces. Where the French Foreign Legion used to 
be something of a frowned upon abnormality, it is increasingly held forth in discussions as something of a 
model to follow in other contexts (e.g. Astor, 2009). On a practical level, foreigners are recruited in growing 
numbers into the armed forces that are short of staff. In the US context, the Pentagon estimates that 
foreigners will provide as many as 14,000 volunteers a year, or about one in six recruits. At present some 
29,000 foreign-born people currently serving are not American citizens (Preston, 2009). Similarly, in the 
UK, Army recruitment officers want a review of restrictions on foreigners serving in the British forces, after 
a surge in interest from Polish immigrants hoping to join up (Clout and Franklin, 2008).  
Welcome as this market based approach to military recruitment (de-linking military service from 
nationality) may be in the armed forces, it is also at odds with self-perceptions of military institutions and of 
their place in society (where the link between military service and nationality is pivotal).4
However, to be credible, to work its symbolic magic, the kind of “nationalization” of soldiers has to 
be constructed as functioning in continuity with conventional understandings of the links between nationality 
and soldiering. The way these constructions work in detail varies with context. Below key themes from US 
nationality conferring ceremonies are used by way of illustrating both the actual effort to construct continuity 
and how that construction works. Confirming and underlining the continuity between nationality and military 
professionalism is one important theme, particularly inside the armed forces. Along these lines, at a 
 The most common 
way to deal with this tension is to try to reaffirm the centrality of nationality; to uphold the idea that 
nationality is essential in the military institutions and that the institution has not given upon this link. A very 
direct and forceful way of doing this is to turn foreign recruits into nationals; to naturalize them to make sure 
to nationalize soldiering. At least in formal terms, naturalizing foreign recruits is a classical way of ensuring 
the continuity between the military service and nationality is upheld. It is in this light that one should no 
doubt see the statute invoked in 2002 by the Bush administration according to which immigrants who serve 
in the military can apply to become citizens on the first day of active service, and they can take the oath in as 
little as six months. Similar policies exist and have been expanded in other contexts. The promise of 
naturalization makes it easier to recruit foreigners many of whom may be more interested in citizenship than 
in the actual military job they are hired for. There is ample evidence of armed forces using this (and also 
having used it in the past). In the UK for example, South Africans in UK armed forces were promised 
passports well before the law that made it possible to grant them these was passed (Nolte, 2007). But the fact 
that naturalization makes recruitment easier does not contradict the importance of naturalizations for 
upholding the nationality-military service link. It should rather be seen as bolstering that link.  
                                                     
4 Note that self-perceptions and institutions is in the plural as I am persuaded that there are profoundly differing 




nationality conferring ceremony in Iraq, a sergeant underlined that his two tours in Iraq had made him aware 
of how useful it was to work with native Arabic speakers but underscored that “the first time around we 
didn't have soldier translators. But now that we have soldiers as translators, we are able to trust more, we are 
able to accomplish the mission with more accuracy” (Preston, 2009). But more generally it is important to 
underline that military service and nationality are still intimately linked and that the relationship has not 
become de-stabilized. Thus, key note speaker Lt. Gen. Lloyd James Austin III at nationalization ceremony at 
the Al Faw Palace (Baghdad) constructed historical continuity by underlining that “This crowd [of 1400 
newly naturalized soldiers] reminds us that the source of our nation's uniqueness is our ethnic and cultural 
diversity.” (Londono, 2008). Finally, it is also important to underscore the extent to which there is continuity 
between past naturalizations and the present ones. The naturalized soldiers need to be taken out of the 
luminal situation of being partly migrant partly mercenaries. In an unusually strong statement to this effect, 
Emilio Gonzalez, director of U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services speaking at a naturalization 
ceremony (for soldiers) that took place at Fort McHenry told the audience that: 
“Starting at Lexington and Concord, from the fields of Gettysburg, to the Argonne Forest, on the 
beachheads of Normandy, Iwo Jima, and Inchon, through the streets of Hue and along sandy 
alleyways in Fallujah, heroes were born from men who came to the United States not as mercenaries, 
but as migrants”(Madigan, 2007). 
  The market for force has pushed public armed forces to reaffirm the centrality of the link between 
nationality and military service. It has pushed them to insist that this link is still pivotal to the public 
profession of protection; the market has triggered a “nationalization” of soldiering where it might have 
triggered a de-nationalization of the profession. Just as immigrants play a key role in other service industries 
they might have become key also to the security institutions. This has not happened and is unlikely to 
happen. Instead the market has triggered a nationalization. Interestingly in the process it has also added a 
dimension to the contractualization of citizenship: a recurring theme is that they have deserved their 
citizenship. Again quoting Lt. Gen. Lloyd James Austin III at Al Faw Palace. “These warriors have already 
sworn an oath to protect the United States. They have put themselves in harm's way to do our nation's 
bidding” (Londono, 2008). Political belonging is something that one can deserve (or implicitly be denied) 
depending on what one contributes. 
Marketing National Belonging 
The fact that the military as a quintessentially national institution responds to the changes entailed in the 
market for force by reaffirming the importance of national belonging may not be greatly surprising. 
However, the extent to which the market is also contributing to a reinforcement of the centrality of national 
belonging may come as more of a surprise to many. The market is often depicted as breaking down the 
centrality of nationality in the protection rather than reaffirming it. However this image is misleading. 
National belonging is reaffirmed as pivotal in the market practices providing protection: the clients focus 
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attention on it, the company providers promote it and hence contractors follow suit and pay close attention to 
it. 
 National belonging is important to those who buy protection in the market. Many states have formal 
restrictions that limit who they can buy their as well as who their citizens can by services from where 
nationality usually figures as a central criterion.5
The extent to which nationality matters seems to be steadily increasing as major clients push for an 
increased presence of co-nationals as employees in the companies.
 But arguably practice is more important than formal 
regulations. Many states, but also armed forces, companies, organizations and individuals prefer to buy 
security services from their co-nationals. This is often presented as being a matter of trust and understanding 
which is necessary for smooth cooperation. Hence armed forces often by far prefer contractors who are either 
of their own nationality or at least who share a common military culture and background. UK armed forces 
are usually more content to work with UK companies possibly stretching it to Commonwealth ones. But also 
private companies and individuals often find it easier to have security provided by people who share their 
security culture and hence often prefer hiring their co-nationals. Those who come from countries that do not 
have their own contractors will often be pleased to hire reputable international companies. But again, the 
nationality of the company is often essential to determining its reputation.   
6
“Where a contractor assigns illegal aliens to work on federal contracts, the enforcement of federal 
immigration laws imposes a direct risk of disruption, delay, and increased expense in federal 
contracting. Such contractors are less dependable procurement sources, even if they do not 
knowingly hire or knowingly continue to employ unauthorized workers” (President Bush quoted in 
Hudson, 2009). 
 One example of how this pressure is 
articulated is a recent US initiative where employers found to use “illegal aliens” will lose their public 
contracts. The employers are made responsible for verifying the status of their employees through an 
electronic system—E-Verify. The rationale for the measure is that 
Measure such as this will clearly not only affect “illegal aliens” but non-nationals more generally who 
present a potential risks to the companies who may lose their public contracts even if they are employed in 
good faith.  
Since nationality is important for the buyers in the market is not surprising to find that companies use 
it amply in their self definitions and in the marketing of their services. Some companies flag their national 
belonging and their link to their national security establishments very directly in their self descriptions. This 
is true for example of a major US company such as MPRI which presents itself insists that  
“With more than 3,000 employees worldwide, MPRI serves the national security needs of the U.S. 
government, selected foreign governments, international organizations and the private sector with 
                                                     
5 In a series of interesting rulings the ECJ has actually tried to diminish the grip of this kind of regulation in internal 
security because it limits the internal market (ECJ, 2006). 
6 Sub-contracting is extensive in the market for protection. 
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programs of the highest standards and methodologies of proven effectiveness…We maintain a 
database of select former military (or military related), DOD civilians, Homeland Security and law 
enforcement professionals who would like to be considered for MPRI requirements.” 
(http://www.mpri.com/esite/index.php/content/about/about_mpri/ ). 
Along very similar lines companies that want to be members of the “British Association of Private Security 
Companies” have to adopt the Association Charter which repeatedly returns to the idea that members work 
in accordance with UK values and policies; an idea most clearly formulated in 6. Of the charter which reads 
that members will: “Decline to provide security services that might be contrary to UK values and interests” 
http://www.bapsc.org.uk/key_documents-charter.asp ). A final illustration of this point is given in the picture 
taken from a small upstart Swedish company (DynSec) which tried (and failed?) to promote itself as a site of 
specifically Swedish / Scandinavian security services. 
 
 Even companies that do not directly proclaim their nationality as essential or pledge allegiance to one 
specific state and/or set of national values and interests usually pledge to respect sovereignty and to work 
within the realms of national and international law. One case to the point here is that of Armorgroup. In the 
advertisement pictured (characteristic of the style and tone of the group generally) it simply promises 
“stringent ethics” and in fact the company employs a full time human rights lawyers and adheres to a number 
of relevant codes of conduct (all of which affirm the centrality of states). In a similar vein, the French 
company SECOPEX  proclaims on it web page that  
“Compte tenu des particularismes de son activité et de ses interventions à l’international, SECOPEX 
se doit de veiller à ce que ses actions soient conduites conformément à des standards élevés 
d’honnêteté, d’intégrité, d’exemplarité et d’exigence professionnelle. Ces valeurs s’inscrivent dans le 
cadre de principes fondamentaux comme le respect des lois qui lui sont applicables, le refus de 
l’ingérence dans les jeux politiques, le rejet de la corruption sous toutes ses formes -publique et 
privée, active et passive- la satisfaction de ses clients ainsi que la solidarité entre le personnel de la 
société.  D’une manière générale, adhère :  
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 aux principes de la Déclaration Universelle des Droits de l’Homme ;  
 à la Convention de Genève de 1949 ;  
 à la convention internationale contre le recrutement, l’utilisation, le financement et l’instruction des 
mercenaires de 1989 ;  
 aux conventions fondamentales de l’Organisation Internationale du Travail ;  
 aux principes du pacte mondial de l'organisation des Nations-Unies ; et oeuvre dans le respect des 
décisions, en ce qui la concerne, de l’O.N.U. et de l’Union Européenne.  
(http://www.secopex.com/index.php/ethique ) 
 
The emphasis on nationality and on state belonging translates into a hierarchy of salaries in the sector where 
nationality is very important for the salary that those working with security are likely to be able to obtain. 
Figures are of course unreliable and highly varying. But on most accounts the differences are remarkably 
large with nationalities of those dominating a contract attracting far larger salaries than their direct allies, let 
alone the numerous “third country nationals”. CHECK numbers (Isenberg, 2008c, Fainaru, 2008). 
Nationality and national belonging is to state it very bluntly, not something the market is downgrading or 
undermining. On the contrary it plays a key role both for the companies and for those who employ them. 
This focus on nationality does not seem to be diminishing rather on the contrary the increasing focus on the 
industry and the attention paid to the extent to which it may undermine the state monopoly on the legitimate 
use of force and needs to be regulated is bound to increase the imprint of national concerns. This makes it 
clear that market tends to have the somewhat paradoxical effect of increasing the centrality of the state and 
of national belonging for those providing protection. The market is actually driving a “nationalization” of the 
protectors. In characteristic public management fashion we are seeing governance through markets that 
serves not to abolish the state but to shift the way it is present and is governing. 
4. Militarized Protection 
Finally, the market for force has had an important impact on the style of protection that is at the centre of the 
citizenship-protection nexus. It has tended to reinforce the conventional core functions in security in public 
and private institutions alike. It has directed resources and attention away from soft forms of protection 
focused on mediation, negotiation and understanding to the more military/security skills. The reason is that 
competition in the market has been more focused on conventional qualifications and skills than on the softer 
ones. This has tainted also the organization of protection in public institutions. 
Competing with Conventional Qualifications 
Companies in security compete not only by reference to nationality. More generally they compete largely by 
reference to classical and core military/security skills. This has lead to an emphasis on conventional military 
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functions in the market where both companies and their employees emphasise and value conventional 
soldiering behaviour and military values. 
 For the companies rationale for this is that those who buy military services usually do so because 
they are persuaded that they need conventional technical competence and expertise to be well protected. This 
expertise is measured largely in terms of conventional military grades and diplomas. Companies therefore 
often highlight their links to the higher ranks in the armed forces and to the links to special sections or forces. 
Many companies in fact base themselves on links to specific Special Forces. The (now defunct) Executive 
Outcomes drew largely on the South African Buffalo Battalion, Blackwater had ties to the US Navy Seals, 
Sandline and later Aegis had links to UK special forces just to mention some of the recurring examples of 
this. The consequence is that networks and grades earned from the armed forces are very important for work 
in the private market. As well captured by an ex. SAS officer “the circuit” of professionals remains the same 
but has just moved into the market (Shepherd, 2008). The number of false special forces is a good indicator 
of just how important it is to be part of the professionals. “One organization of SEAL/UDT veterans 
estimates that there are more than fifteen thousand men, and incredibly, at least one woman  [women are not 
allowed into the education], who claim to be SEALs” (Lee Lanning, 2002: 176). The importance of publicly 
sanctions qualifications, grades and diplomas extends also to those companies in the market that do not 
only—or even mainly—provide conventional military services but have branched out into other areas and do 
their best to retain them. Hence in a company such as Kroll e.g. hierarchies and leadership of activities that 
have little to do with the direct security provision (e.g. consultancy and risk consulting) are directed 
according to the military rank of the employees (Interview, 2009). 
However, formal qualifications are not the only way in which companies can underline their 
attachment to conventional professionalism and expertise of the military/security professional. Reference to 
past experience but also behaviour and body language plays an important role in conveying the message. The 
result is the encouragement of an almost cliché militaristic behaviour. Commenting for example on the 
aggressive ways of Blackwater employees in Iraq (shooting, insulting, screaming, driving people off the 
roads etc.), Donald Dominick (senior analyst at Aegis Specialist Risk Management) explains that “I'm not 
sure that any other firm doing that job would be able to do it any different. The reality is that the US State 
Department is not going to allow one of their people to go out to a meeting” otherwise protected. (quoted in 
Berndtsson, 2009: 191). Body language and clothing is another way of conveying attachments to the military 
profession. Much as the Mafia adopts the language of films and novels (Gambetta, 1991) so do security 
professionals seem to draw free inspiration from fiction about mercenaries and private security professionals. 
Bodies built with the help of training and hormones are omni-present but so are tattoos; often in various 
ways reflecting the tough sides of the profession as e.g. one reading: “the unwanted, doing the unforgivable, 
for the ungrateful”(Fainaru, 2007). As one observer remarks commenting on Blackwater employees—who 
refer to their own style as “CDI–Chicks Dig It”—“as a group they resemble actors in a badly cast B movie 
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about mercenaries” (Young Pelton, 2006: 9). More generally, the sex scandals involving contractors—the 
most known is probably the sex ring organized by DynCorp employees in Bosnia—also seem to indicate that 
a conventional macho behaviour is well represented in the sector (for Dyncorp see e.g. Singer, 2003, for 
discussions of  recent KBR case see , Isenberg, 2008b).  
 As this emphasis on military qualifications and values indicates, the market for force is tilting the 
balance of what kind of protection is valued and demanded towards the more conventional. One could even 
think of the market as forcing private sector employees to re-invent military culture so that it makes sense in 
a market context. Precisely how this reinvention looks would be a wonderfully interesting subject for 
research. But it is rather safe suggest that it would most be multiple and complex as contractors come from 
different backgrounds and work in a variety of contexts (for an intimation of the complexities involved see 
Sapone, 1999). The point here has been the more overarching one of underlining the extent to which these 
multiple reinventions reflects the broader trend to frame protection in military terms (hence the reference to 
militarization) and hence the need for a language and for symbols in which to express this. 
Markets and Soldiering Hierarchies 
The militarizing imprint left by the market is not confined to the private security professionals working in it. 
It also has some rather direct implications for public armed forces that would deserve some very serious 
consideration. While rather extensive thinking has been done about the potentially beneficial effects of 
acknowledging private security contractors as a legitimate part of the provision of security since this extends 
“the logic of appropriateness” prevailing in the military institution to these actors (in particular Avant, 2005). 
Little consideration has so far been given to the fact that the influence may working in the reverse: the 
market may alter the “logic of appropriateness” (that is ordering and hierarchies)  inside public security 
institutions.  
Public security professionals are not hermetically sealed off from the market, confined to a public 
world imbued by public military values. In conflict zones they work and live together with private 
contractors. They meet them all the time. There is plenty of evidence of the competition this creates in terms 
of who is the most competent and legitimate provider of security; a competition that sometimes ushers in 
outright violence between contractors and soldiers (e.g. Isenberg, 2008a). More than this, public security 
professionals participate in the market. As the preceding discussion has made amply clear, their expertise is 
sought after and valued. They have alternative career paths in the market. In fact, the careers may not so 
much be alternative as concomitant. Many countries have arrangements that allow members of their security 
establishments to work temporarily in the private market. More than this, some countries such as the UK 
have programs specifically designed to encourage public security professionals to work in the market. It is 
considered to enhance their skills and to be generally useful (Kinsey???). The consequence is that the values 
in the market are constantly brought into the armed forces. It would be odd if this did not leave any trace and 
indeed there is plenty of signs that it does. 
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Values of the market and even contact with markets are of course not universally embraced by public 
security professionals. The UK policy of not only sanctioning but promoting the market and hence increasing 
its symbolic importance is an exception rather than a rule. However, the salaries and career prospects in the 
market speak a language of their own. They bolster the positions and prospects of the public security 
professionals with the kinds of skills and qualifications that are sought after and the network necessary to get 
a position. This means that the importance of the kinds of conventional skills and values, the belonging to 
Special Forces and to closed security networks becomes significant in a very tangible and concrete way also 
in public security institutions. The consequence is that internal hierarchies tend to be changed to the 
advantage of those representing a traditional take on security. Translated into more tangible terms this means 
that the position of those who resist the transformation of armed forces away from the conventional military 
values is enhanced. The idea that the armed forces should be “soft”, “post-modern” (Moskos, 2000) “forces 
for good” (Elliot and Cheesman, 2004) have been intensely contested. The market makes them even more 
difficult to defend. In a similar vein, the market makes transformation of armed forces with a past of massive 
human rights violations more difficult. As explained by one observer; security professionals are valued for 
their past experience; consequently “what should be a national shame [in the Chilean armed forces], turns 
into a market asset due to the privatization of the Iraq war.” (Stoner, 2008). Along the same lines (but with 
the opposite values), Eben Barlow (CEO of Executive Outcomes) explains that 
“Those in the military field know just how good the former SADF was and how capable some of our 
people were. It is a great pity that this government, in the name of transformation, has turned its back 
on those skills” (Seery, 2007). 
The market for force is remilitarizing not only the protection provided in private markets but also the 
protection in public markets. The reason is the valuation of conventional, core military/skills in the market 
which translates as increased status for those with qualifications but also with an image and a behavior that 
reflect this. The tight relationship between the markets and public security paves the role for the diffusion of 
these values also into the public sphere. This does imply that produces a homogenous and unique 
understanding of protection. There is plenty of scope for resisting and contesting the way that this 
professionalism is formulated. The human rights lawyers employed by a company such as Armorgroup insist 
that basic humanitarian law is key to conventional professionalism. The BAPSC is striving to promote the 
image of private companies as less gendered than their public counterparts (Schultz and Yeung, 2008). CACI 
emphasizes its local knowledge produced amongst others by anthropologists and other intellectuals. Taking 
account these variations into account does not alter the basic focus that these skills are promoted as key to an 
essentially technical security/military understanding of protection which is promoted through the 




The citizenship-protection nexus is never fixed. As the this paper began by underlining, although it is pivotal 
to contemporary political practice it is constantly struggled over. Who is a citizen and what kind of 
protection this entitles them to on what kind of terms are constantly evolving. This paper is (an unfinished 
and very preliminary  sorry Yagil) attempt to flesh out some reflections about the implications of the 
development of the market for force for this nexus, for the way it is articulated, for the arguments and lines 
of thought that tend to prevail in it. The resulting story (just told) has emphasized that the markets have 
reinforced a more general trend towards a “contractualization of citizenship” where right to have rights (in 
this case the right to have protection rights) cease to be defined by political belonging (to the community 
providing protection) and instead become defined by market positions and contractual relationship. The 
consequence is an accentuation of hierarchies among citizens. The account then proceeded to underline the 
extent to which the market has reinforced the significance of the national—anchored in the state—in the 
citizenship-protection nexus. Rather contrary to what is often assumed in the market is hence not acting in a 
zero sum relationship to states it is bolstering their centrality. By prompting states to re-affirm and 
consolidate the centrality of national belonging for protectors and by commodifying national belonging the 
market has led to a reaffirmation of the centrality of national belonging in the citizenship-protection nexus. 
Finally, the paper suggested that the market has entailed a trend towards more militarized (focused on 
conventional core military/security skills). The reason is the prominent role played by these skills in the 
market where customers and companies alike tend to privilege them both in their practices.  
This paper tells a disquieting story about markets driving a contractualization, nationalization, and 
militarization of the citizen-protection nexus. People find themselves confronting not only what  
“amounts to a complete inversion: from triadic balance of power, in which the social state protects 
citizens in civil society against the full exposure to the market, to one in which citizenship collapses 
into a dyadic instrument of unbalanced power pitting an alliance of state and market against 
individuals—now bereft of both state protection and membership in civil society” (Somers, 2008: 
37). 
They also have to confront a nationalization and militarization of their rights to claim protection rights. A 
priori this might seem amply sufficient to trigger serious political debate and contestation. However, it has 
not. Debate has usually focused on the accountability and regulation of market actors; not on the market as 
such. There are two main reasons the politics of market practices remain largely unproblematized, invisible. 
The first is the common assumptions that markets are politically neutral. That assumption has been the main 
target of this paper. The other reason, only hinted at in passing above (and it is therefore worth insisting here) 
is that markets are often assumed to be of relevance only to the states hosting the largest international 
companies in the market (i.e. the US and the UK) and those where they have the most visible operations 
(Afghanistan and Iraq).  This is a misconception. Security professionals from all over world work in the 
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international market. But perhaps more significantly, the struggle for defining what legitimate protection is 
does not take place in idiosyncratic national contexts well protected from international change. Quite the 
opposite is true, expertise, understandings, organizational schemes and technologies travel and transform 
admittedly widely diverging systems with plenty of idiosyncracies. The extent to which the market has re-
shaped the citizenship-protection nexus also in countries that do not officially encourage them (such as 
Germany, Sweden, Hungary, Chile, Colombia, Uganda, Tanzania, or Japan) should therefore not be 
underestimated. Hopefully the argument in this paper will help trigger critical curiosity about how market 
practices is re-fashioning the citizen-protection nexus also in countries such as these. 
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